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Poverty is still a major problem in Pakistan.  Worse, the excellent progress made in 
poverty reduction in the 1970s and 1980s has been reversed in the 1990s.  That is the bad news. 
The good news is that Pakistan is unusually well placed to return to rapid reduction in poverty. 
We have long known that agricultural growth is closely related to poverty 
reduction. Recent studies by Peter  Timmer and by Martin Ravallion  and their colleagues 
provide massive statistical evidence of this relationship. Rural growth and agricultural 
growth have a major effect on poverty reduction; urban growth and manufacturing 
growth do not.  At first glance that is strange because farmers are not the poorest rural 
people, and the direct benefits from agricultural growth are distributed roughly 
proportionately to size of landholding. 
The poor in rural areas are heavily concentrated in the rural non-farm sector.  They 
produce non-tradable goods and services.  That is, local demand  is essential to their 
growth.  It is rising agricultural incomes that provide that growth in local demand.  Thus, 
agriculture’s massive impact on poverty is indirect, working through expenditures on the 
rural non-farm sector.  The bulk of those expenditures are for consumption goods. 
Pakistan has unusually productive resources that are highly responsive to the 
favourable forces of globalisation and technological change.  In the 1970s and 1980s the 
agriculture of Pakistan grew at better  than four percent per year, sufficient to reduce 
poverty levels rapidly.  To return to those growth rates requires several public actions. 
Institutional reform in the irrigation system needs to reverse the losses that have 
occurred from poor management.  There must be increased expenditure on the 
agricultural research and extension systems and that expenditure must be subject to a few 
priorities and increased efficiency.  The rural road and education systems need to be 
massively expanded.  Much more emphasis needs to be placed on expansion  of the high 
value horticultural sector for which Pakistan has a strong comparative advantage in 
international markets. 
Those actions can be expected to bring a return to high growth rates in the four to 
six percent range and a resumption of rapid decline in poverty and its virtual elimination 
in a ten to twenty year period. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Poverty is still a major problem in Pakistan.  The World Bank’s income 
standard for defining a poverty baseline is $1 per day of purchasing power parity 
income on a 1993 base.  By that standard, as reported in World Development Indicators 
for 2001, 31 percent of Pakistan’s population fell under the poverty line in 1996. 
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Malik  (1991) reports a decline in absolute poverty in rural Pakistan of nearly 
50 percent from 44 percent in 1969-70 to 24 percent in 1984-85.  Malik’s poverty 
line is somewhat higher than that of the World Bank.  Nevertheless, it would appear 
that poverty reduction has slowed or reversed since the mid-1980s. The period     
1967–70 to 1984-85 was one of much faster agricultural growth than at present.  
That would explain a setback in poverty reduction in the more recent period. 
Of course, poverty is a multi-faceted phenomenon.  Educational attainment, 
health status, food security, women’s participation, empowerment of the poor, and 
many other factors describe the reality of poverty.  However, income is a central 
factor, both driving and complementing most of the other characteristics of poverty.  
For that reason, the OECD/DAC sets income poverty at the centre of the poverty 
reduction stage.  The target of reducing the proportion of the population under the 
income poverty line by one-half by 2015 is the most cited of the OECD/DAC targets.  
In an earlier period, Pakistan approximately met the rate of poverty decline implicit 
in that target. 
The World Bank, in its country strategies, tends to use an average response of 
poverty reduction to GDP growth to define its basic strategy for  poverty reduction.  
Since that average response is large, policies that most efficiently accelerate GDP 
growth are seen as the central means of reducing poverty.  The policy emphasis is on 
prescribing macro policy based adjustments in the economy.  In practice, those 
policies have been a mixed bag for both growth and poverty reduction, as stated in 
detail later in this paper. 
The elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to GDP growth applied by the 
World Bank is 2.12 [Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire  (1998)].  That is, for each one 
percent increase in GDP growth rate, the proportion of the population falling under 
the poverty line is reduced by 2.12 percent.   With that measure, in general, it takes a 
six to eight percent growth rate to achieve the OECD/DAC targets for income 
poverty  reduction. 
However, the variance around the average elasticity of poverty reduction with 
respect to  GDP growth is very large.  In fact, GDP growth only explains 37 percent 
of poverty reduction, with a massive 63 percent  left to be explained by other factors 
[Ravallion and Chen (1989)].  Recent analyses of large intertemporal and interregional 
data sets show that the structure of the growth is a major factor in explaining the bulk 
of poverty reduction.  The structure of growth does indeed matter very much. 
Another factor of importance is the initial condition of income distribution,  and 
particularly of land distribution.  When that distribution is highly unequal, not only is 
growth slower than with more equal distributions, but the efficiency of growth in 
reducing  poverty is greatly reduced as well. 
This paper is therefore concerned with the structural influences on growth, 
and particularly the role of the agricultural sector in those processes.  The paper 
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little capital or land, depending primarily on labour for their income.  Thus, the 
critical factor in reducing income  poverty is increased employment.  Employment 
growth is important in increasing the amount of employment per member of the 
labour force.  As labour markets tighten rising real wages provide further increase in 
incomes of the poor.  Poverty declines rapidly when employment growth is 
sufficiently rapid as to raise real wages.  That gives a double benefit to the poor. 
As will be shown in the main text, it is agricultural growth that provides the 
rapidly increasing employment that is essential to rapid decline in poverty levels.  
However, it does so through complex processes the indirect effects of which are 
greater than the direct effects.  The complexity of these processes has served to 
distract attention from the importance of agriculture in poverty reduction.  High 
agricultural growth rates require priority to public policy and public investment, both 
of which tend to be under-emphasised in structural adjustment programmes. 
The good news in Pakistan is that it has excellent agricultural resources that 
are potentially highly responsive both to modern technological advance and to the 
forces of globalisation and trade.  The  bad news is that agricultural growth has been 
slow in the past decade or so. The critical elements in a high agricultural growth rate 
for Pakistan are irrigation efficiency, technological improvement  based on research 
and extension, public investment in rural roads, other elements of physical 
infrastructure and education, and shift to higher value crops encouraged by the 
opening  of global markets.  The progress on each of these has been sub-optimal over 
the last decade.  But, the institutional basis is there for major improvements in each. 
 
THE GENERAL RELATION BETWEEN GROWTH  
AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
The traditional interpretation of basic data led to the conclusion that in the 
early stages of economic growth, inequality tended to at first increase and only in 
later stages of growth did it decrease.  This pattern is often called a J curve, for its 
distinctive shape, or the Kuznets curve, for the data generated by Simon Kuznets that  
was thought to document this relationship [Kuznets (1955)]. 
Most of the analysis that led to this conclusion was based on historical data for 
the currently high-income countries.  A range of literature from 1971 to 1995, 
covering developing countries, seemed to support the Kuznets hypothesis about 
worsening of  income distribution in early stages of growth.  More recent literature, 
based on more sophisticated data analysis finds contrary results. 
Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) reviewed 63 surveys for 44 countries 
spanning 1981–92 and found no support for the worsening of income distribution 
with growth.  They further reviewed data from 45 countries for which time series 
data were available and found the bulk of variation in income distribution accounted 
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over time within countries.  From these data, they conclude that the distribution of 
income is quite stable over time within countries. 
A large number of other studies confirm that growth  does not worsen income 
distribution, and therefore does decrease absolute poverty and the proportion of the 
population in poverty.  [Fields (1989); World Bank (1990); Squire (1993); Lipton 
and Ravallion (1995); Ravallion (1995)]. 
Even before the current plethora of data on poverty reduction, time series for 
Taiwan showed that its pattern of growth provided decreased inequality right from 
the start [Lee (1971)].  For example from 1970 to 1985, the Gini coefficient fell from 
0.321 to 0.277 [Thorbecke and Wan (1999)].  Now that the relation of agricultural 
growth to poverty reduction is better understood and documented, the Taiwan case is 
particularly important for lessons about the processes of agricultural growth that 
rapidly reduce poverty. 
India has the best, and perhaps only, long-term series of comparable data on 
income distribution in a large developing country encompassing considerable 
geographic variation in the various poverty related variables.   These data give “no 
sign that higher growth rates in India put upward pressure on overall inequality”  
[Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire (1998)]. 
Timmer shows, based on sophisticated analysis of the Deininger and Squire 
data (1996) that  “each one percent increase in  per capita income for the overall 
population is matched by a one percent increase in income of the bottom forty 
percent in the income distribution”  [Timmer (1997)].  That is, growth is neutral to 
the distribution of income.  All income classes participate equally. 
All the preceding studies calculate relations between growth and more complex 
definitions of poverty, in addition to the headcount measure cited above.  In every case, 
the impacts are roughly the same or somewhat more favourable for the very poorest. 
If the distribution of income does not change with growth, then a simple 
calculation shows to what extent population is lifted above any given absolute 
income line.  It is on this basis that the World Bank estimates the effect of growth on 
poverty reduction. 
Analysis of 20 countries shows an elasticity of poverty reduction with respect 
to income increase of –2.12 [Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998)]. Ravallion and 
colleagues estimated the elasticity of poverty reduction (proportion of the population 
below the poverty line) with respect to income for India at –2.2 [Datt and Ravallion 
(1998)] and for Indonesia as –2.1 [Ravallion and Huppi (1989)]. A figure of –2 
means that starting with 40 percent of the population below the poverty line and a 
one-percent rate of increase in the per capita income; the poverty ratio would drop to 
39.2 percent  in the first year.  It would drop to 36 percent in the first year with a 
five-percent growth rate in per capita income.  With that high growth rate, the 
poverty ratio would drop in half in seven years.  Thus, on average, such a high 
growth rate easily meets the OECD/DAC poverty targets. Employment Multipliers from Agricultural Growth   375
Reliance on this average relationship is misleading in three respects.  First, it 
ignores the large variation around the mean and the implication that other factors 
may be important to poverty reduction, including the structure of growth.  Second, 
the high growth rate countries generally have a favourable structure of growth.  In 
particular, it is difficult for low and middle-income countries to achieve high growth 
rates without rapid growth in agriculture.   Thus, the poverty reduction attributed to 
growth may well be due to a particular structure of growth.  Third, focus on the 
overall growth rate removes attention from the critical public policies and 
investments required by those elements of the structure that are most important to 
poverty reduction. 
As stated above, using the absolute poverty measure of $1 per day of income, 
growth only explains 37 percent of the change in poverty [Ravallion and Chen   
(1997)].  That leaves 63 percent to be explained by other factors.  What those factors 
are is the subject of the next section. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF GROWTH AND POVERTY 
It  is clear from the preceding review that there is large variation among 
countries and over time in the relation between growth and poverty reduction.  That 
variation is largely due to variation in the rate of growth in the agricultural sector.  
However, the agricultural impact on poverty reduction is seen in its effect in 
increasing the demand for labour-intensive non-farm goods and services produced in 
rural and market town areas in small-scale enterprises.  These goods are of low 
quality, with high transaction costs in international trade.  Their market is thus 
dependent on domestic sources, primarily agriculture. They are, in the trade 
vernacular, non-tradable commodities. 
 
POVERTY AND AGRICULTURAL GROWTH 
Two recent studies provide detailed data on the relation between the structure 
of growth and poverty reduction. They confirm similar results from earlier, but much 
less comprehensive data. The two recent studies are by Ravallion and Datt (1996) for 
India, and Timmer (1997) for a cross-section of a large number of countries. Several 
studies of other countries confirm the broad relationships.   
The two studies differ in methodology and in source of data, but find the same 
striking relationships.  The Ravallion and Datt paper has the advantageous of 
drawing from a single basic source without the weakness of cutting across very 
different countries.  However, the Indian experience, like that of any one country, 
has specifics of its own.  Thus, it is important that findings from the India data are 
confirmed by the cross-national study from Timmer, by the individual studies for 
other countries, and by theory.  Each will be discussed below.  In sum they make a 
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Preceding the studies of Timmer and Ravallion,  Ahluwalia (1978) presented 
data showing that increased  agricultural output per head of the rural population 
decreased  poverty.  Dharm Narain furthered this analysis with important conceptual 
additions [reported in Mellor and Desai (1985)].  Mellor and Desai (1985) elaborate 
at length on the relations described by Narain, the supporting data, and alternative 
interpretations of the data. 
For both Ahluwalia and Narain, the data cover a period when both agricultural 
growth and poverty fluctuated considerably, without any sustained agricultural 
growth or poverty reduction.  Thus, their analyses essentially deal with a situation 
not  of steady growth but of fluctuations in income.   In practice, those fluctuations 
were substantially driven by the varying effect of weather on agricultural production. 
The Ravallion and Datt (1996) work for India is recent enough to include 
periods with far higher agricultural growth rates than those depicted in the earlier 
studies as well as sustained growth beyond previous peaks and declines in poverty 
far beyond previous troughs. 
Ravallion and Datt relate change in yields of crops to poverty.  They show 
that reduction in poverty is a result of growth within sectors, not the transfer of 
labour from a low earning sector to a high earning sector.  The latter is the basis for 
the Kuznets J curve.  But what is truly striking is that agricultural growth and tertiary 
sector growth have a major effect on poverty reduction and manufacturing  growth 
does not.  Further the service sector growth that has the favourable effect is the 
small-scale portion of that sector, which we will show later is itself closely related to 
agricultural growth. 
The Ravallion and Datt data show that 84.5 percent of the substantial poverty 
reduction in India in the period of analysis was due to agricultural growth.  That is 
truly startling data.  They also show little effect on poverty of the many programmes 
that directly target the poor. 
Growth of manufacturing in India has historically been biased towards large 
scale capital intensive industry, so the manufacturing data may be somewhat biased 
as compared to a market oriented structure [Mellor (1976)].   But, the Timmer (1997) 
data confirm the Ravallion Datt findings for a large cross section of countries. 
The various studies show that industrial growth does reduce poverty from the 
direct effect of income increase, but it concurrently has an unfavourable effect on the 
distribution of income thereby reducing the effect on the poor.    Agricultural growth, 
including its indirect as well as direct effects, does not have the unfavourable 
distributional effect. 
Ravallion and Datt show that wage rates are important to poverty reduction 
and that higher farm productivity is closely associated with higher wage rates.   
Similarly, food prices are important and higher farm productivity reduces food 
prices.  Thus, it is farm production that drives poverty reduction.  In a later section, 
we will elaborate on this relation of agricultural growth to non-farm employment and 
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Timmer (1997) uses the Deininger-Squire data set for poverty and purchasing 
power for 35 developing countries and relates those data to agricultural GDP per 
capita. “A one percent growth in agricultural GDP per capita leads to a 1.6 percent 
increase in per capita incomes of the bottom quintile of the population”. (p. 3). 
Unlike Ravallion and Datt, Timmer shows a positive elasticity for industrial GDP.  
Nevertheless, the agriculture elasticity is 38 percent larger than the industrial 
elasticity. 
The 27 countries and 181 observations (studies) from 1962 to 1992 in the 
Timmer sample of the Deininger-Squire data include 3.3 billion people in 1995 or 
two thirds of the population of low and middle income countries as classified by the 
World Bank [Timmer (1997)].  On average, agriculture accounted for 25 percent of 
GDP and 51 percent of the labour force.  Countries are roughly equally divided 
among regions of the world, with some under representation of Africa. 
Datt and  Ravallion (1998) do not find a declining trend in the elasticity of 
employment with respect to agricultural output.  The power of the relationship holds 
up over time. Thus, the current decline in the rate of poverty reduction is due to 
decline in the agricultural growth rate, not due to declining power of that variable. 
Gini coefficients for sub-sectors of the economy tend to be unstable.   
However, the following data from Sharma and Poleman (1993) corroborate other 
evidence on the high degree of equality in specific agriculture related sub-sectors.  
Pakistan would likely show similar coefficients, with similar implications for poverty 
decline. Sharma and Poleman show that increments to crop income alone skew the 
distribution towards the well to do, with a Gini coefficient of 0.86, far above the 
national Gini coefficient.  That finding is of course consistent with early critics of the 
Green Revolution.  See also Adams (1999) on this point. 
In sharp contrast to crop income, the Gini coefficient for dairy production, 
which is very important to the poor in India because of its labour intensity, is 0.11.  
That is an extraordinarily low Gini coefficient, but is quite consistent with the 
observation that dairy animal numbers vary little by size of farm, while dairy 
marketing’s are inversely related to farm size.  This is all consistent with the well-
known favourable impact of increased dairy production on the poor.  The Gini 
coefficient for off-farm work in rural areas is a still low 0.22.  That also reinforces 
the data that show off-farm income of the rural poor is an important source of 
poverty reduction [Adams (1999)].  Thus, when rising agricultural incomes are spent 
in those sectors, they redistribute income towards the poor. 
The data show clearly that it is growth of agriculture that reduces poverty, not 
growth in general.  One misleading interpretation should be avoided.  Typically high 
overall growth rates are achieved when agriculture grows rapidly.  That is because 
the resources used for agricultural growth are only marginally competitive with other 
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sectors, as well as being a stimulant of growth in the labour surplus non-tradable 
sector [Mellor (1976)]. 
The countries that grew the fastest from 1985 to 1995 experienced a 
narrowing of the income gap [Timmer (1997)].  That means that agricultural growth 
resulted in faster overall growth and an improvement in the income distribution.  
Thus, emphasising agriculture in order to improve income distribution does not 
result in slow growth.  The sectors are more complementary than competitive.   
Conversely, leaving out the forces that accelerate agricultural growth, as has been 
increasingly the case in the past decade, provides slower growth and leaves out the 
poor. 
The average elasticities cited at the beginning of this section are strongly 
influenced by high agricultural growth rates.  Thus, it is grossly misleading  to think 
of those elasticities as applying to some average growth rate. Those are 
predominantly the elasticities when agriculture grows rapidly.  However, in the 
1990s, prior to the economic setback in East and Southeast Asia, overall growth rates 
were high, but agricultural growth rates had slowed, and hence the pace of poverty 
reduction declined.  It follows that in that period and those circumstances, the 
elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to GDP growth declined. 
Thus, agricultural productivity increase has a major effect in reducing 
poverty, and the  effect is relatively greater in its impact on the poorest and the 
distribution of income among the poor.  Industrial growth has much less or even no 
effect in reducing poverty [Ravallion and Datt (1996) and Timmer  (1997)].  Service 
sector growth has no effect for the large-scale part and a substantial positive effect 
for the small-scale portion. 
If growth occurs leaving the agricultural sector out, two onerous burdens fall 
on the poor.  First, the overall growth rate will be lower.  Second, the component of 
growth that reduces poverty will be missing.  As we will show later, rapid agricultural 
growth is more easily achieved now than some decades ago, but it does require overt 
actions by government. 
 
AGRICULTURE-LED NON-FARM GROWTH 
The circumstantial evidence is strong that agriculture’s powerful poverty 
reducing effect comes substantially through its impact on the rural, non-farm, small-
scale sector.  There is considerable knowledge of this sector from the studies of 
Liedholm and his colleagues [e.g. Liedholm and Meade (1987)].  They conclude that 
this sector is large, employment intensive, expands readily in response to increase 
demand, and is largely driven by farmer demand. 
Nevertheless, the evidence about the size of the sector, the proportion of 
incremental farm income spent in this sector, and the employment intensity is 
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calls for intensive study.  The following paragraphs summarise the current state of 
knowledge of this sector. The analysis commences with my early work on 
agricultures GDP multipliers and the subsequent work of Hazell and Delgado.  The 
innovation in my more recent work is to carry that analysis a step further to analyse 
employment multipliers as a means of directly examining impact on poverty. 
Because the agricultural sector in low-income countries is so large, 
accelerated growth into the four- to six-percent range adds immense purchasing 
power [Mellor (1995)].  That is because this growth is substantially driven by 
improved technology (e.g. yield increasing crops of the Green Revolution) and 
mobilises previously under-utilised farm family labour resources within agriculture. 
Agricultural growth is productivity enhancing. 
Several empirical studies cited above document that farmers spend a 
substantial proportion of incremental income on locally produced non-farm goods 
and services. Liedholm and Meade turn that around and state that the rural non-farm 
sector derives a high proportion of its demand from agriculture.  Since this is a large 
employment intensive sector it is logical to turn to these forces to explain the 
powerful effect of agriculture in increasing employment and reducing poverty.   
This argument is also consistent with the lag in the effect of agricultural 
growth; the fact that highly skewed distribution of income from land removes the 
poverty reducing effect, and the important wage increasing effect of agricultural 
growth.  Further,  the power of this income effect causes a tightening of the labour 
market that cannot be explained by the agricultural growth alone.  Because it is the 
income growth that drives the process it does not matter that the initial income effect 
is concentrated in the hands of the middle peasant rather than the poor.  The poor 
benefit in the next round.  They benefit massively, not marginally. 
It is notable that rapid agricultural growth is based on forces that increase 
factor productivity. That is particularly true of land productivity, but labour 
productivity also increases. Thus, even when labour is very low cost, the elasticity of 
employment with respect to output is no greater than 0.6, and as labour markets 
tighten that elasticity drops to  0.3.  Agriculture’s large impact on poverty reduction 
is not due to its labour intensity of output increments. 
Three questions arise about stimulation of the rural non-farm sector.  How 
large is the sector that is driven by agricultural incomes and is it a tradable or non-
tradable sector?  How employment intensive is  this sector? And, to what extent is it 
driven by purchase of production goods and to what extent by consumption goods? 
These questions are difficult to answer. Although the questions are important, 
National income Accounts are not categorised appropriately to answer them. 
 
THE SIZE OF THE AGRICULTURE-DRIVEN SECTOR 
  There are two ways to get at the issue of the size of the agriculture driven 
non-farm sector.  One is by surveys of the production pattern and source of demand John W. Mellor  380
for output for the sector thought to serve agriculture.  The other is through analysis 
of the consumption patterns for incremental income of farmers. Neither type of 
information is well developed.  Farmer expenditure data rarely give sufficient 
breakdown to allow analysis of impact on the rural non-far, non-tradable sector. 
Surveys of small business in rural and market town areas are infrequent and usually 
lacking in the necessary detail with respect to sources of demand. 
Delgado spells out in some detail why it is the non-tradable sector that is 
important to the employment increasing poverty-reducing impact of agricultural 
growth [Delgado, et al.  (1998)].  The non-tradable (goods and services that do not 
enter international trade) sector cannot by stimulated to growth by international 
exports.  The labour force and production systems are such that they are not 
employable in the short run producing goods and services for other than the rural 
market. 
Of course, in the long run, with education and gradual integration of markets, 
labour will move into tradable sectors.  The story of low incomes is the slow pace at 
which that transformation occurs.  In the meantime, rapid growth in demand for such 
output provides employment, expands the number of entrepreneurs, and creates a 
favourable environment for the transition to tradables.   The interaction between 
agriculture and this large sector is an important part of the transition to a modern 
economy. 
Peasant farmers spend a high proportion of incremental income on low quality 
goods and on non-exportable goods and services.  Examples are expanded housing, 
personal services, increased lower level education, increased health services, and 
local transport.  Note that where labour is cheap, prospering farmers hire a 
substantial addition of labour so as to shift family labour away from farm production 
to education, leisure, and marketing activities [Hayami and Kikuchi (1999)].  This 
too, is an important source of incremental employment amongst the poor of low-
income countries.  These are all non-tradable and are produced primarily by labour 
with very little capital. 
Consumption studies suggest that in middle-income countries, e.g. Egypt, this 
sector, located in market towns and rural areas has an initial GDP roughly equal to 
that of agriculture [Mellor (1999)].  It is striking that even at this stage of 
development the sector is large and non-tradable.  In Africa, with very low incomes, 
it may be only one fifth the size of agriculture [Delgado, et al. (1998)]. 
In very low income societies, with minimal commercial differentiation, as in 
most of Africa, the multipliers from agriculture growth to the non-farm sector are 
much weaker than in more differentiated societies.  However, Delgado, in a careful 
analysis for sub-Saharan Africa, points out that marginal propensity to consume non-
tradable agricultural commodities is very high.  Thus, farm incomes may also drive 
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In middle-income countries, the agriculture driven  non-farm sector may be as 
large as agriculture [Mellor (1999)].  The incremental income in farmer’s hands will 
be spent more than proportionately in that sector.  That is, the income elasticity of 
demand for the products of the rural non-farm sector is typically on the order of 1.5. 
 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE AGRICULTURE-DRIVEN SECTOR 
   Employment elasticities in the agriculture driven non-farm sectors are high, 
close to one.  Increasing demand drives increased output.  As long as real wages are 
constant, there is no incentive to increase labour efficiency.  Since very little capital 
or land is employed in this sector, virtually all the gross income is return to labour.      
Empirically, compared to farming, if GDP in the sector is equal to that of 
agriculture [Mellor and Gavian (1999)], but twice the labour intensity,  the initial 
labour force is twice that  of agriculture.  Typically in low-income countries, about 
half of base income is spent on production services and locally produced 
consumption goods  [Bell, et al. (1980);  Hazel and Roell (1983)].  With a multiplier 
of two that would account for the rural non-farm sector being equal in size of GDP to 
agriculture. 
With an average income elasticity of demand for rural non-farm commodities 
of 1.5, and an elasticity of employment of 0.9, employment expands at 1.35 percent 
of the base year for each percent increase in the rate of growth of agricultural 
income.  With a 5 percent growth rate in agriculture, 2.5 percent population growth, 
the rural non-farm sector expands  at a rate of 6.25 percent.  Employment expands at 
5.6 percent.  The additions to employment in the agriculture-stimulated local non-
farm sector is 58 percent greater than that in agriculture.
1  That is the key point about 
the agricultural growth impact on poverty. 
 
AGRIBUSINESS AND CONSUMPTION GOODS 
Fertiliser and other chemical and mechanical inputs to agriculture are in the 
tradable sector and tend to be imported or produced by capital-intensive processes.  
Increased demand for such goods does not add much to employment and that 
demand could have been provided from exports. 
In contrast, the local marketing services for these inputs and for output are 
both labour intensive and largely non-tradable.  Thus, the increase in demand from 
agriculture stimulates production and employment that are net additions to the 
economy that could not come from other sources.  That will remain true as long as 
there is poverty representing inadequate employment opportunity for the wage 
earning classes.  
 
1With an elasticity of employment with respect to growth of 0.6 in agriculture and 0.9 in the rural 
non-farm sector, 5.0-2.5(1.5)+2.5=6.25. (5.0) 0.6=3.0. (6.25)0.9=5.6. 5.6÷3.0= 1.9.  3.0 is 58 percent 
larger than 1.9. John W. Mellor  382
Studies of marketing margins suggest that the stimulus to the rural and market 
town non-tradable sector is equal to about 10 percent of the value of incremental 
agricultural production since a high proportion of incremental production depends on 
purchased inputs and is marketed. 
Consumption studies in Asia show about 40 percent of incremental income 
are spent on locally produced non-farm goods and service  [Hazell, et al. (1983)].  
These  are all highly labour intensive in their production. 
Thus, consumption goods comprise about three-quarters of incremental 
demand for rural, non-farm non-tradables and production services about one-quarter. 
It is the consumption expenditure that is dominant [Mellor and Lele (1973)]. 
 
RICH PEASANTS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION  
A substantial literature in the immediate post Green Revolution period stated 
that the  Green Revolution concentrated incremental income in the hands of the land 
owning classes, including the middle peasant or kulak, to use the Marxian term.  
Consequently, it was believed, the poor did not participate in farm income growth.  
The concentration of income led to further concentration of land ownership.  That 
was the basis for much of the anti-Green Revolution spirit of the 1970s. 
This exposition points out that in fact increased agricultural incomes in the 
hands of the middle peasant or kulak has powerful employment linkages, but they 
take time to operationalise.   The initial studies did not allow for that time and in any 
case were only concerned with the direct affect of income growth. 
The important point is that an initial skewing of the benefits of agricultural 
growth towards the higher income rural people is not antithetical to poverty reduction. 
The issue is not the initial distribution of the increased income, but the expenditure 
patterns from that income.  Middle peasants in low-income countries spend a high 
proportion locally on non-tradables, thereby providing a stimulus to production and 
particularly to employment, that cannot be obtained in any other manner. 
Delgado,  et al. (1998) carefully documents that in Africa.  Incomes and 
commercial differentiation are so low that the non-farm goods and services receive 
relatively little stimulus.  However, the increment to demand for agricultural non-
tradables is very large, stimulating a large increase in demand driven production of 
high value agricultural products (livestock and fruits and vegetables), and even for 
some non-tradable basic staples.  Thus, an initial stimulus to agricultural growth 
from technological change (high-yielding varieties of basic staples) has strong 
multipliers back to other sectors of agriculture that are highly labour intensive.  The 
effects are precisely as described for the rural and market town non-farm sectors. 
 
THE RURAL AND MARKET TOWN NON-FARM SECTOR 
   The rural and market town non-farm sector is inadequately studied, with no 
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know that the sector typically represents over half of all non-farm employment 
[Liedholm and Meade (1987)].  The sector is largely located in rural and small town 
areas, the effective demand comes largely from local sources, particularly including 
agriculture, and the sector expands readily in response to increased demand 
[Liedholm and Meade (1987)]. 
The sector represents a far higher share of employment than of GDP, even 
more so than agriculture.  That is because it uses very little capital per worker, uses 
relatively unskilled labour, and pays low wages.  Agriculture uses substantial land 
per worker with a substantial return to that land.  Tradable industry uses far more 
capital per worker and tends to use more skilled labour. 
The small-scale sector is the path out of poverty for the poor who possess little 
education and are either underemployed or use a substantial proportion of their time 
in job search. Experience in the small-scale sector then prepares them for movement 
up to higher paying jobs in the tradable sectors. Thus, the sector is not only large, but 
is an important zone of transition as well.  Development is a step by step process and 
we see in country after country that steps in the process cannot be skipped without 
deleterious impact on the poor. 
The growing importance given to micro enterprise and micro credit in foreign 
assistance programmes reflects a growing recognition of that importance.  What is 
not yet generally recognised is that without growth in farm incomes, the demand for 
this sector’s output does not rise and efforts to increase access of some to the sector 
is at the expense of others already in the sector.  Agricultural growth is absolutely 
essential to this sector playing its important role in lifting the poor out of poverty 
[Mellor (1995)]. 
Analysis of farmer expenditure patterns shows that in middle income 
countries, 40 percent of incremental income is spent on locally produced non-farm 
goods and services [Hazell and Roell (1983); Bell and Hazell (1980); Haggblade, et 
al. (1989)].  In lower income countries, the percent is much lower because of much 
higher expenditure on food and lesser differentiation of the economy.  The 
multipliers of agricultural growth on non-agricultural growth in the references just 
cited are corroborated in macro studies such as Rangarajan (1982) for India. 
However, Delgado (1998) shows that in such situations, much of farm 
production is non-tradable—livestock and fruits and vegetables are non-tradable on 
quality and transport grounds and even much of the grain sector is non-tradable (low 
quality, high transport costs).  In such economies, the demand of farmers for these 
products is elastic.  Thus, in both very low income undifferentiated economies and in 
more advanced middle income countries the bulk of employment growth is in sectors 
that depend on increments to local demand derived from agriculture for expansion of 
demand, production and hence of employment. 
A simple rhetorical question makes the point about this large, employment 
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else can this massive number of people produce in the short run?  Hossain (1988) 
shows that if agricultural incomes are not rising, credit for small-scale firms simply 
expands the ones receiving credit at the expense of those already existing firms not 
receiving the additional credit.  The expansion without effective demand reduces 
prices and returns to labour.  The process spreads the misery. 
 
DATA FROM EGYPT AND RWANDA, WITH 
 IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN  
Egypt has considerable relevance to Pakistan.  Although Egypt has nearly 
twice the purchasing power parity per capita income of Pakistan, the share of 
agriculture in the economy is similar (Pakistan 27 percent and Egypt 17 percent in 
1999, [World  Bank (2001)].  The agriculture of both countries is based largely on 
large irrigated areas.    
Table 1 presents data on shares of incremental employment and GDP in a high 
growth rate scenario for Egypt.  These data serve as a rough indicator of what those 
relationships might look like for Pakistan.  As a sharp contrast, data for Rwanda are 
also presented as an example of a very low-income country. 
As stated before, national income accounts are not kept in a manner that 
allows segregating the rural non-farm sector, even though it is the most important 
sector from the point of view of employment growth and poverty reduction.   As a 
result of deficiencies in data classification, considerable detective work was required 
to generate the numbers in Table 1.  As much as possible, the numbers in Table 1 are 
based on the national income accounts, but that source must be leavened by rural 
survey data and specific studies of the sub-sectors that are delineated.  
 
Table 1 
Egypt and Rwanda, Shares of GDP and Employment Growth,  
High Growth Future 
 Egypt  Rwanda 
Sector 










Agriculture 7 18 33 26 
Rural  Non-farm  9 48 26 60 
(Sub-total)  (16)  (66) (59) (86) 
Urban  84  34 41 14 
Total  100  100 100 100 
Source:  Mellor and Gavian (1999) and Mellor (2001). Employment Multipliers from Agricultural Growth   385
In a high growth scenario for Egypt, agriculture and the agriculture driven 
non-farm sector account for 66 percent of employment growth and only 16 percent 
of GDP growth [Mellor and Gavian (1999)]. GDP growth is largely from the 
tradable sector, employment growth largely from non-tradables.  The tradable sector 
provides much of the effective demand for expansion of agriculture, particularly the 
high employment livestock and horticultural sectors.  Agriculture and its stimulus to 
the non-tradable sector provides the bulk of employment growth. 
A very low-income economy, such as Rwanda, is much more dominated by 
agriculture than a country like Egypt.  Agriculture accounts for more than 3½ times 
as high a proportion of GDP growth, compared to Egypt.  Agriculture and the rural 
non-farm sector driven by agriculture account for essentially all of employment 
growth (86 percent). 
Pakistan, as stated, would be much more like Egypt than Rwanda.  A 
somewhat higher proportion of both GDP growth and employment growth would be 
agriculture-related. That means that close to three-quarters of employment growth 
would be attributable to the direct and indirect effects of agricultural growth.   
Similarly the indirect  effects of agricultural growth on employment would be on the 
order of 2½ times as large as the direct effects within agriculture itself. 
Thus, employment growth and poverty reduction in Pakistan will be 
dominated by what happens in agriculture.  If agriculture grows as rapidly as in the 
best periods of the past, poverty will come down rapidly. 
In interpreting these numbers for Pakistan two important caveats are in order. 
First, given the significant portion of Pakistan’s agriculture taking place in the Sindh, 
with its very large landholdings and somewhat feudal conditions, the employment 
multipliers will be reduced significantly.  Second, at some point, and more likely 
sooner than later, Pakistan’s unusually poor record in education will slow 
employment growth. 
The education requirements for the rural non-farm sector are lower than for 
large-scale urban industry, and there is substantial scope to absorb illiterate workers 
in the farm production sector.  Nevertheless, the higher paying jobs in the rural non-
farm sector do increasingly demand educated people.  Failure to provide those 
people will slow the expansion of the sector and shift expenditure towards less 
labour-intensive enterprises.  Slow progress in education will be an increasingly 
serious problem for Pakistan.  Given the importance of population growth rate to 
poverty reduction, as pointed out in the next section of this paper, the unusually poor 
record on women’s  education is an immediate drag on poverty reduction. 
Thus, for pro-poor growth the old concept of balanced growth needs to be 
resurrected.  Yes, open up the economy, play to comparative advantage, follow-up 
pro-growth macro policy and let the private sector loose.  But, at the same time take 
the public sector  actions needed to move the agricultural sector to provide effective 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN 
 The thrust of the preceding analysis is that Pakistan requires a high growth 
rate in agriculture, well above the population growth rate, if poverty is to be reduced.  
It is the rate of growth of agricultural output per capita that gives the boost to 
demand growth for the rural non-farm sector.  Because Pakistan has a high 
population growth rate (2.6 percent in 1980–99) the required agricultural growth rate 
is higher than for a more normal rate of population growth.  That is, to achieve a 
two-percent per capita rate of growth of agricultural growth requires a 4.6 percent 
rate of agricultural growth.  Whereas India, with a 1.3 percent rate of population 
growth in the same time period, only requires a 3.3 percent rate of agricultural 
growth to get the same 2.0 percent per capita. 
In agriculture the difference between 3.3 percent and 4.6 is significant.   
Fortunately, Pakistan has unusually productive agricultural resources that can 
respond well to modern technology and to globalisation. 
Government of Pakistan data shows a constant 4.1 percent rate of growth of 
agricultural output from 1975 to 1991.  During much of that period poverty rates 
declined rapidly.   That was particularly the case in the Punjab where the growth was 
very rapid and the distribution of land and of agricultural income relatively equal.  
However, data for 1991–97 show a slowing of the agricultural growth rate to 3.7 
percent (or a little over one percent per capita).  Presumably poverty ceased to 
decrease or decreased very little in this more recent decade.         
What are the factors that would reduce the agricultural growth rate? The most 
important factor is the declining efficiency of irrigation.  Second, is declining 
effectiveness of the technology generation and application process.  The third factor 
is not taking sufficient advantage of the forces of globalisation to increase the value 
of output growth by a shift in composition of output.  These are of course the 
standard problems in accelerating agricultural growth.  They will be reviewed briefly 
here in the context of implications to poverty reduction. 
 
Irrigation 
Pakistan  has an immense irrigation resource watering highly productive soils.  
Numerous reports over the years have focused on the mismanagement of that 
resource and the declining land productivity.  I have estimated elsewhere that the 
impact of the declining productivity of the irrigation resources has been masked by 
increasing productivity from technology and that the isolated effect of irrigation 
deterioration translates into a two percent per year loss of productivity [John Mellor 
Associates (1994)]. 
The World  Bank  and the Asian  Development Bank, working closely with 
the Government of Pakistan have recommended a set of institutional reforms, pilot 
projects for which are underway.  These seem to be the needed reforms and as they Employment Multipliers from Agricultural Growth   387




      Numerous studies have shown the immense productivity of the Pakistan 
agriculture research system and its complement of extension [for a review of this 
literature so John Mellor Associates (1994)].  However, reduced funding in real 
terms for this complex of research and extension has slowed progress at a time when 
achieving results is becoming more difficult, requiring more use of basic science. In 
addition, the scope of agricultural research needs to be broadened to service the 
potentials in high value horticulture.  That in turn requires attention to complex 
complementary relations between public sector research and private sector research, 
both international and national. 
 
Shifting the Structure of Production  
  Towards High Value Commodities 
Once the easy breakthroughs in catching up to yields in more advanced 
countries  are achieved, high growth rates are increasingly achieved by shifting the 
product mix towards high value commodities.  It is notable that the high agricultural 
growth rate countries achieve rates of growth of agricultural production of four to six 
percent [Mellor (1995)].  That high growth rate cannot be achieved on a sustained 
basis only by raising  yields of the basic field crops.  It requires a large increase in 
value of output from shift to high value horticultural crops and a shift to intensive 
livestock production.  The potential in horticulture has been greatly increased by two 
major phenomena of the past two decades, both of which are grouped under the 
rubric of globalisation. 
First, technology has continued to reduce transport costs rapidly, partly by 
direct effects on transportation efficiency, and partly be making commodities less 
bulky and less perishable.  Second, markets for horticultural products, although by 
no means fully open, have opened more than in the past.  Concurrently, in much of 
the world, incomes are rising rapidly and tastes are shifting towards horticultural 
products, increasing  the total size of the markets.  Thus, now in Pakistan the demand 
for horticulture can grow much faster than domestic demand, thereby facilitating 
substantial increase in the agricultural growth rate. 
Pakistan is well located relative to large markets in the Gulf countries.  It can 
exploit those markets more fully by emphasis on improved efficiency in agri-
business, obtaining scale economies in the region by concentrated effort, and 
working to reduce transport cost and information gaps.  It is notable that Egypt 
devotes 18 percent of its crop area to horticulture and orchards.  Southern California, 
with a similar irrigation regime and climate devotes 35 percent of its cropped area to John W. Mellor  388
high value crops.  The comparable figure for Pakistan is only three percent.  There is 
ample technical scope for shift to high value crops in Pakistan. 
It should be noted that Afghanistan has an important complementary relation 
with Pakistan in the horticultural export area.  Afghanistan too has a comparative 
advantage in production of horticultural exports, but it will remain deficient in export 
infrastructure. It is logical that those exports move out through Pakistan, improving 
the economic ties between the two countries and providing Pakistan additional scale 
economies in the exports of horticultural  commodities. 
 
Inequalities of Land Ownership 
The evidence is now overwhelming that highly unequal distribution of land 
slows growth and greatly reduces the impact on poverty reduction.  Agricultural 
growth  has been effective in reducing  poverty in the Punjab.  However, the 
inequalities of land distribution are far greater in the Sindh.   Those inequalities have 
retarded the growth rate and reduced the impact of what growth has occurred to 
essentially zero for poverty reduction. The weight of the Sindh  in overall agriculture 
and poverty in Pakistan is sufficiently great that it biases the poverty numbers 
upward greatly.  To an outsider it is not clear what can or should be done about this, 
but the problem needs to be illuminated in the context of concerns about poverty.  As 
noted above, educational status is important to poverty reduction from agricultural 
multipliers.  The poorer participation of the poor in education in the Sindh is a 
further retardant to poverty reduction in the context of agricultural growth.   
 
THE REQUISITES OF PRO-POOR GROWTH 
The requisites of pro-poor growth fall in two categories. 
First, vigorous pursuit of the macro policies and privatisation that will bring  
as vigorous export-led growth as possible.   This part of structural adjustment has 
been good for poverty reduction. 
Second, follow the essentials of rural growth.  These fall in  three categories.  
Each of these categories requires public sector actions and investment.  When 
structural adjustment has mindlessly reduced public expenditure is has had a 
powerful negative effect on agricultural growth and hence on poverty reduction.  The 
challenge is how to get the good aspects of structural adjustment without the bad. 
The first category covers reduction of transaction costs and thereby facilitating  
specialisation and trade in agriculture.  That requires all weather roads, telephones, 
and electricity. It should be noted that these are essentials for direct poverty 
reduction.  Teachers and health workers normally insist on living where there are all 
weather roads.  Even if assigned to isolated schools, they will tend to go less 
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The second category covers improved agricultural technology.  Agriculture 
requires land and the land area is limited.  Therefore, rapid agricultural growth 
requires yield-increasing technology and more intensive cropping patterns.  In both 
cases, progress is positive but very slow using only indigenous methods of 
experimentation.  They are very rapid when modern science is brought to bear. In 
Africa, so little has been achieved in the past few decades that application of 
scientific innovations of over a century ago (e.g. Mendelian genetics) can bring large 
improvements.  Eventually, that element of science reaches diminishing returns and 
more recent breakthroughs will be needed.  Pakistan is close to the stage of needing 
to use the more recent basic science breakthroughs. 
The third category covers the new institutional structures needed for 
technology and specialisation. Marketing of basic staples has gone on for generations 
and the systems are well in place and effective in the private sector.  However, new 
forms of inputs, fertiliser and pesticides are needed as farmers purchase more of 
those and produce a lesser proportion themselves; new forms of output, especially 
perishables are needed for intensification; credit needs become so large that 
institutions that plug into the global financial systems are needed.   These are all 
most efficiently performed in the private sector or perhaps in farmer owned 
cooperatives. 
However, there is a problem in starting such institutions.  The private sector in 
developing countries tends to be trade-oriented, expecting rapid turnover.  These new 
institutions of  technology and specialisation by definition start with low volume and 
may not be initially attractive to the private sector.  It is for government to monitor 
these activities to  assist them as necessary and then withdraw as the volume builds. 
There is an immense literature for all parts of the world on developing 
smallholder agriculture.  See the five thousand references in the American 
Agricultural Economics Association review of the post war literature, divided by 
continental area [Martin (1992)]. With the gradual exit of foreign aid from 
agriculture, the current environment of foreign aid  is one of large numbers of 
donors, pursuing objectives driven by the national  politics of their home countries to 
acquire sufficient support for foreign aid to continue programmes. 
Weak governments tend to succumb to diagnosing the needs of each donor 
while designing their development strategies in an effort to maximise foreign aid.  
The resultant patchwork of programmes is unlikely to establish the priorities 
essential to pro-poor growth.  This represents a dilemma without an obvious 
solution.  Once a solution is found, it proves all too often to be temporary.  Meeting 
the donors’ current poverty targets requires that for each country there be a  plan, for 
example the PRSP, subscribed to by the government and the donors.  That plan must 
set a few simple priorities that can be achieved.  Once those priorities are met or 
institutionalised,  then additions can be made. It is agreeing to abide by those 
priorities that are difficult for the collectivity of donors.  John W. Mellor  390
CONCLUSION 
Pakistan has an unusually favourable natural resource context for rapidly 
reducing poverty levels. To take advantage of this opportunity requires a major 
emphasis on agriculture. That emphasis must address the serious institutional 
problems in irrigation management, the need for increase level and effectiveness of 
spending on agricultural research and extension and providing public sector support 
in business information and other means to the agri-businesses that can bring rapid 
increase in the importance of high value crops for export.  The gross inequalities of 
land distribution in the Sindh need also to be recognised as barriers to both growth 
and even more to poverty reduction. 
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John Mellor has been on the scene for a considerable period of time and is 
both a theorist as well as a practitioner. He has been involved in countless scenarios 
and understands their implications well enough. However, as he himself says, 
poverty is many-faceted and is intractable in its solutions. The manifestations that he 
has given are so time-consuming and the gestation period so prolonged that one 
might as well give up on the effort to reduce or eliminate poverty. 
The problem with the international thought process is not that they are not 
making any efforts at one earth creation but that they are looking for easy options or 
what they call doable actions. All kinds of poverty situations are put in to one 
category. The problem of aggregate indicators is that theses are misleading and that 
in countries round the world the options and solutions are different and more specific 
to any country. And even within these countries the solutions may differ from 
regions within the country.  
Neither are the solutions mathematical. The evidence that a 1 percent  increase 
in growth rate reduces poverty by 2.12 [based on elasticity] is untenable and lacks 
evidence. The method of eliciting these kinds of figures is to fool oneself and reduce 
any guilt feeling that one might have. Financial subventions do not reduce poverty. It 
is linked to the resource base and how well the society understands to stand by the 
poor and help them through a process. The nature of growth and the inner 
dimensions are important. If Industry growth is 147 percent in car manufacturing, it 
does not help the poor because the income augmentation for the poor is just not there 
given the current technological advancements. In fact it may be that the rich are that 
much more reluctant to part with their income for the poor and the effort is to buy 
luxury. A similar case can be made for the beverage industry where the pneumatic 
systems do not fare well so far as income for the poor is concerned.  Suffice it to say 
that these mathematical permutations and combinations do not bring about the 
desired income augmentation or reduction in poverty that these theorists seek. The 
evidence is sketchy and they are to be challenged. The industry that is allowed 
capital intensity equivalent to the levels of the developed countries for a variety of 
reasons does not cater for increase in employment. Thus the Dawood textile Mills in 
Karachi [to give an example] had 25000 employees of various categories in 1966 and 
was an industry with a social face. In 1985 it had fewer than 8000 employees and 
although the turn over was many times that of 1966 but it was actually at a loss. 
Social face of the industry was nowhere visible.  
Having said what I have said let me play the devils advocate and suggest that 
these theoretical advancements have a distinct cultural role to play. It forces planners Zafar Altaf  394
and others involved in policy issues to take a look at the various options. The tragedy 
has been that there is where the planners of a country have to come out on the side of 
the poor rather than on the side of the rich. Thus making the situation worse than 
what it was previously.  
Agriculture and not industry as such is more relevant and John Mellor makes 
a strong plea for agricultural growth. And I agree with him. What has been 
Pakistan’s experience? Agriculture growth rates have not been stable. Starting from 
1992 to date it has touched a high of 11.7 percent and as low as –5.2 percent. The 
policy stability is not there. Agriculture requires factors that are not easily noticeable 
by a government. First it has nothing to do with the investment that is made in the 
sector. If it were so then the simplicity of the situation would have enabled Pakistan 
to be on top of the world. Whereas I agree with John that it requires Policy matters 
but not that investment is just as essential. Agriculture can make do with its own 
resources if the governments do not mess it all up. The governments are busy in 
working the vested interests and what the international agencies and others seek as 
investment are really exploitative situations created for the purpose of the vested 
interests. The excellent agriculture resources that John Mellor talks of are the ones 
that are irrigated areas of Pakistan. What of the other areas? It is my contention that 
the income of the other areas can be much more provided the government is sensitive 
to the requirements of these areas. Here the requirement is not in money but in 
developing a demand structure that allows for new products. But that is different 
argument. Suffice it to say that it might be worthwhile to look at the segment that 
provides to the GDP substantially but has hardly any investment. The point merits 
consideration because the linkage of growth with investment is not established.  
John Mellor has another ability that is laudable. He in the process of 
discussing issues goes through the currency of the current literature. I have little to 
say about this except that the literature has to be studied and examined in the context 
of the given nuances of a country or what in local parlance may be called the Qibla 
of the country.  
One only has to move to Cholistan, Balochistan, Thar, or the Northern Areas 
to realise the barrenness of the theoretical approach. There are people living there 
and if not looked after can be and are potential danger to the nations viability as a 
nation. Let me give an example. Manoor is a valley that I visited in 1954 and it was 
full of hope. I visited it again in 2001 and it is full of despair. There is an abundance 
of water and land. The people are praying for another fight with India and then there 
is then some hope of communications improving. Yet all that it produces are organic 
commodities and should theoretically provide surplus income. Marketing becomes a 
headache for the lack of access is real.  
The other excellent point that John Mellor raises is the non-farm growth. That 
is a truism that is built around the fact that equity and fairness is really a matter of 
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growers and I do not want to belabour the point but that there is the government of 
the day always worrying about the powerful vested groups that want everything 
cheap or free so that they do not have to pay to the farmers. The cotton farmers have 
been getting 40 percent less than the world process ever since I remember. The sugar 
farmers are not paid for two to three years. How can there be any income 
augmentation when they are at the mercy of the informal money lender and even the 
ADBP shortchanges them. The reality is different and it is wise to understand this. 
The incremental income is just not there for the farmer to utilise elsewhere and help 
develop a market. If that money did come to the farmer his first option is to invest in 
the improvement of the land that he has. 
In fact the inadequacies of data are so monumental that they force us to opine 
on matters of welfare and nation-building. Policy options go haywire and that seems 
to suit the vested groups. Consumption and living conditions indicating quality of 
living would lay bare the assertions we usually make on the basis of our opinions.  
Punjab gives an indication of how rural markets can develop on their own. 
Gujranwala, Gujrat, Sialkot and Daska are some examples of rural towns gone wild 
on technology. There are no unskilled workers available in these areas. Names of 
other towns also come to mind. 
The paths out of poverty are many. There are so many ways to skin a cat. 
There are just as many ways to get out of poverty. It is a matter of will and policy 
stability. The flower growers of Pattoki with assets of less than five acres are a case 
in point. An indicative survey would show how the existing assets were used in a 
manner that allowed for the genius of a people to come out. The net income when I 
last carried out a survey of that area is 100,000 rupees per acre. Credit and 
technology have been two facets of policy that the international speakers always 
mention perfunctorily. Credit has always been short for the Pakistani farmer. 
Technology has been a buzzword for far too long. What is available at 25 percent in 
the world is protected. What for?  
Meanwhile the agriculture sector will prosper only when honesty comes to the 
industrial sector. The sector has been misusing its facilities to the point of being 
criminals. The authorities have always looked the other way. It is time to change all 
this.  
John Mellor than fills in the paper with data on Egypt and Rwanda. Both let 
me say from the outset are irrelevant to us. Neither do we have the killing abilities of 
Rwanda nor the oil of Egypt. Egypt has a total of 6 million hectares. It does what it 
does with it. 
The implications for the country do not follow from the data. The issues on 
irrigation are much more complex and will defy the policy-makers in Pakistan till we 
increase the application efficient of water. The ADB and WB have done this and 
that. The project is in tatters. The institutional; reform is not going through. The 
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technology matters if and only if it is affordable and it can add to productivity. The 
biological technologies are more relevant at the moment than hardware technologies.  
As for the shift to high value crops is concerned it is about time people stopped 
talking about it. It has been with us since the third plan. Forget it. The issues are 
different. All the arguments are barren if the surpluses are not there. Yes poultry can 
be exported to these middle east countries but how. They want a subsidy on air 
cargo, a production subsidy and the feed-meat ratio of the birds is 4.5:1. Try selling 
with that ratio. The whole issue revolves around the micro knowledge and not the 
macro universality. Yes, land is ownership skewed. We are going to make it more 
skewed because our powerful need more lands. Let the WB take cudgels. Let the 
ADB take cudgels. Let John Mellor say this to the policy-makers. And let us see 
what happens to rational thought. That is why I keep on saying that culture is 
important. I think that John Mellor be inducted as a farmer and given land at the 
hefty price of Rs 284 per acre. And he can take up to 4 squares.  
My exponential experience of pro-poor growth is different from John Mellor. 
It will be seen whether privatisation and export led growth will lead to reduction in 
poverty. It is a futuristic judgment. I have given my views on this umpteen times. 
The surpluses are not there. Pakistan will have to worry about welfare considerations 
based on its own steam. 
The three suggestions are difficult to implement. Transaction costs cannot be 
made cheaper. The inputs are getting too expensive thanks to the structural 
programmes. Agriculture technology has to cater for about 48 variables and is highly 
consilient [bits and pieces from whatever is relevant]. And these technologies are 
developed over time. Given the limitations of the mind these are not going to come 
easily. The third option pertains to new institutions. And I agree, these of course 
have to be consistent with our own thinking and cannot take on the hybridisation of 
many country’s systems. The institutional arrangement cannot have pat solution for 
these are to be developed over time. Pakistan has been through three years of very 
strong and committed governance with the Finance Minister and all the worthies 
from the very best of international institutions. Why cannot they do the needful?  
That Pakistan is an exciting country with highly variable social systems, 
tribal, castes, and variations of all kinds. Are these a disadvantage in developing 
along lines that satisfy these individual cultures? The fact is that universal solutions 
are not there. The solution will have to be indigenous. It can be managed. There is 
much that can be said for the paper and much against it. The principle is one that 
Jung gave us. Enantio Dromia  allows for friction of opposites to go forward. 
 
Zafar Altaf 
Formerly Federal Secretary, 






The Pakistan Society of Development Economists deserves to be 
congratulated for organising the Ghulam Mohammad Memorial Lecture in honour of 
one of the most distinguished Agricultural Economists of the country.  The society 
also deserves bouquet for the thoughtfulness in inviting Prof. John W. Mellor, an 
outstanding development economists of world fame, for delivering the lecture. 
I compliment John W. Mellor for his excellent paper and equally outstanding 
presentation.  Theme of the Memorial Lecture is very timely as poverty and its 
reduction have become focal points in the thinking of donor agencies as well as the 
policy-makers in developing countries in their efforts aimed at development. The 
author has rightly emphasised the role of agriculture in poverty reduction because of 
its pervasive and all round importance in the economies of developing countries in 
general and of Pakistan in particular.  Quoting from Sohail Malik’s findings, Mellor 
has reported that absolute poverty in rural Pakistan declined from 44 percent in 
1969-70 to 24 percent in 1984-85.  However, the poverty reduction has slowed since 
the mid 80s.  He has observed that the period of 1969-70 to 1984-85 was one of 
much faster agriculture growth than the present, which should explain the setback in 
poverty reduction. 
Mellor has rightly argued that besides the growth rate, structure of the growth 
is very important in poverty reduction efforts.  Poverty, a multi faceted phenomenon, 
is affected by educational achievements, health, food security, female participation in 
labour, employment etc.  Nevertheless, income is the key factor both in the 
manifestations of poverty as well as in the efforts to reduce it.  In view of the 
domineering role of agriculture in developing countries, through its forward and 
backward linkages, its growth and development hold the key to the success of 
poverty reduction efforts.   The growth in agriculture would provide demand for the 
goods of non  farm rural sector which offers vast scope for employment of the skilled 
and semi skilled labour.  The products and services produced in this sub sector have 
to find a domestic market as these goods may not be able to hold their own and 
compete in the export markets because of their low quality and high transport cost. 
Relying on published sources, Mellor has pointed out that structure of growth 
is important in explaining the bulk of poverty reduction.  Another factor which 
matters in this context is the condition of income and land distribution.  John Mellor 
argues that employment and poverty are two sides of the same coin.  Accordingly, 
critical factor in reducing income poverty is increasing employment.  Employment 
growth is important in increasing the amount of employment per member of labour 
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raising the income of the poor and reducing poverty.  The premise of John Mellor’s 
paper is that agricultural growth is important for providing rapid increase in 
employment opportunities.  However, it is a complex process, via the indirect effects 
which may exceed the direct effects.  Complexity of the process has served to 
distract attention from the importance of agriculture in poverty reduction, he opines. 
The critical elements in achieving high agricultural growth rate in Pakistan, 
identified by John Mellor, include: (i) irrigation efficiency, (ii) technological 
improvements based on research and extension, (iii) investment in rural roads and 
other infrastructure and education, and (iv) shifting to higher value crops in response 
to global markets. 
Reviewing a large number of studies on growth and income distribution 
Mellor concludes that growth does not necessarily worsen income distribution.   
Thus, it does reduce poverty and proportion of population in poverty.  He argues that 
pattern of growth is important in decreasing income inequalities and in this context 
quotes the example of Taiwan where growth and development in agriculture were 
helpful in reducing poverty rapidly.  The large variation observed among countries 
and over time in the relation between growth and poverty reduction is largely due to 
variation in the rates of growth in agriculture.  Mellor has rightly observed that the 
impact of agricultural growth on poverty reduction is through its effect in increasing 
the demand for labour intensive non-farm goods and services produced in rural and 
market towns.   Recent studies have also confirmed that increased agricultural out-
put per head is crucial in decreasing poverty.  The Ravallion and Datt data show that 
84.5 percent of the substantial poverty reduction in India during the period of 
analysis was attributable to agricultural growth.  Their data also showed little effect 
on poverty of many programmes that directly target the poor.  In poverty reduction 
efforts increases in wage rates and farm productivity are important.  Higher farm 
productivity also helps in reducing food prices.  Mellor infers from the evidence 
marshelled by Datt  and Ravallion that current decline in rate of poverty reduction is 
due to decline in agricultural growth rates and not due to declining  power of that  
variable.  The countries experiencing fast growth in their agriculture have also 
invariably achieved high overall growth rate.  Fast growth in agriculture is 
complementary to high overall growth rate in the economy.  Mellor also quotes the 
examples of East and South East Asia that prior to the economic setback in the 1990s 
the overall growth rates experienced in those regions were high.  But as agriculture 
growth rates slowed the peace of poverty reduction declined.  He concludes that if 
growth occurs leaving agriculture sector out the overall growth rate will be lower and 
the component of growth that reduces poverty will be missing.  He also emphasises 
that rapid agricultural growth rates in modern times can be achieved more easily but 
it requires overt action by the Government.  Mellor needs to be complimented for 
forcefully pleading the cause of agri. development in efforts aimed at reducing the Comments  399
poverty.  Many of the developing countries should benefit from Mellor’s  prescrip-
tion provided they follow it truthfully. 
Mellor has pointed out that the institutional reforms recommended by the 
World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the pilot projects under way in Pakistan 
are expected to sort out the problems in the irrigation system and point out the scope 
for further improvements.  I wish the results of these projects were available to 
confirm the optimism of John Mellor for poverty reduction on this count. 
Prof. Mellor has emphasised the role of high value crops in realising high 
growth rate in agriculture.  I do not want to sound skeptical to his prescription but 
one has to take into account the ground realities such as: (i) recent progress in this 
context, (ii) reluctance of the developed countries to open their markets, (iii) 
technical and capital requirements  for shifting from low value to high value crops, 
(iv) perishable nature of the produce, (v) high transport and packing costs, (vi) 
extend of market, and (vii) infrastructural requirements to support this type of 
agriculture. 
For achieving high growth rate in the agriculture sector there is still a vast 
potential through improving the productivity of resource use in agriculture.  The 
average yields of field crops obtaining on majority of the farms are much less than 
the corresponding yields obtained by ‘progressive’ farmers, using judicious mix of 
inputs and technological developments.  However, this would require addressing the 
socio-economic and technological problems culminating in low yields on majority of 
the farms. 
The recurrence of water shortages and drought during the critical period of 
crop growth in the recent years have adversely affected performance of agriculture in 
Pakistan and its potential for reducing poverty.  It has also thwarted the efforts aimed 
at cultivation of high value crops.  No doubt investments in agricultural research, 
education and extension have high pay offs.  However, the system in recent past has 
suffered from lack of leadership due to rapid turn over at the top.  The uncertainty 
surrounding the institutional set up in the wake of right sizing and downsizing has 
also demoralised the scientists. Accordingly, a number of experienced as well as 
upcoming researchers have been forced to seek green pastures elsewhere, resulting in 
out migration of highly scarce resources and brain drain. Such a climate and 
environment do not bode well for the development of technology and investments in 
the sector.  The comparative advantage enjoyed by Pakistan in the production of 
many farm commodities has not been translated into comparative advantage in 
international trade because of poor infrastructure, high incidentals and lack of quality 
control. The recent graduation of Pakistan from the import regime to export regime 
in wheat/sugar has highlighted a number of problems and issues: (i) low prices for 
the growers, and (ii) problems of storage and quality etc. 
The costs of inputs and field operations have been rising as subsidies were 
phased out and general sales tax imposed on the inputs.  The commodity prices have Abdul Salam  400
either stagnated or declined, eroding the purchasing power of farmers.  The 
instability, both of production and prices has not helped the cause of poverty 
reduction in rural countryside.  Achieving high growth rate in agriculture requires 
investment in research, technology production and adoption and the conducive 
environment in the form of favourable price relationships.  In view of the increasing 
commercialisation  marketing  of inputs and outputs has assumed critical importance 
in agriculture.  The inefficiencies in the marketing of farm commodities have badly 
hurt the farmers resulting in low prices of the produce and large scale  resource 
transfers from agriculture.  In fact, marketing has emerged as the most important 
problem in Pakistan’s agricultural development in the last few years. 
In view of the foregoing situation and instability in agricultural growth rate 
experienced in recent years, the achievement of sustainable growth rate of 5 to 6 
percent, required to raise the per capita income sufficiently rate to make a dent on 
poverty would be really a challenging task.  This would require a careful analysis of 
the emerging policy issues and adequate investment of resources, both material and 
human capital, in accordance with the importance and potential of the sector.   
Without the development of agriculture the efforts aimed at poverty reduction are 
unlikely to succeed. 
In closing, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Pakistan Society 
of Development Economists for inviting me to participate in their annual Conference 
and discuss a very interesting paper.             
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